Sharp criticisms from the Republicans
News article headlines reporting criticisms toward the speech
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (left)
(photo: U.S. Government Publishing Office) |
Two months after the Korean war advanced, Republican Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska sharply criticized Acheson’s speech that “Mr. Acheson had publicly excluded South Korea from the Asian area that the United States would defend, and thus had ‘given the green light ’ for the Communist invasion,” the New York Daily Times reported. (1) Gen. Dwight Eisenhower joined him in blaming Acheson for “encouraging the outbreak of the Korean War.” (2) Keeping a firm stance against Communism meant more to the Republicans than simply opposing the Soviet ideas and ideologies in the time when anti-Communism sentiment was already prevalent across the country. It gave them a chance to frame the Democrats and Truman administration for “being soft on Communism” or “sheltering Communists within the government.” (3) In many cases, Dean Acheson was a target of the Republican party’s political propaganda. The Congressional Republicans in 1949 held him responsible for losing China and asked him to resign. In 1950, Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin insisted that he had a list of Communists working in the State Department and even accused Mrs. Dean Acheson of being “a sponsor of a ‘notorious’ Communist-front organization.” (4) After the Korean War broke out, in the eyes of the Republicans, Acheson’s speech in 1950 became another evidence proving the Truman administration’s unprofessional way of handling Asian affairs.
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Criticisms toward the State Department
Critics argue that the Truman administration’s foreign policies were Eurocentric and ignorant about Asia. They claim that this clumsy manner of the administration in dealing with Asian affairs ultimately resulted in losing China to the Communists and reflected in the speech by unknowingly inviting North Korea to invade South Korea in 1950. Prominent American author Robert T. Oliver asserted in 1950 that South Korea’s position had been weakened by “official and unofficial indications…that [the U.S. government] did not intend to defend the [Republic of Korea.]” (5) He pointed out that Acheson’s speech and the Truman administration’s decision not to defend Formosa appeared in the eyes of Kremlin that South Korea was not only “hopelessly weak militarily” but also “had been diplomatically abandoned.” (6) In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walton Butterworth in January 1950, Korean ambassador to the United States John Chang expressed his concern about Acheson’s exclusion of South Korea from the defense perimeter in his speech to the National Press Club. Chang said, “the fact Korea found itself on the other side of that line…appeared to raise the serious question as to whether the United States might now be considered as having abandoned Korea.” (7) More than seventy years after the Korean War, still many South Koreans believe that the United States “committed an act of betrayal” and accuse Dean Acheson of “igniting” the North-South conflict. (8)
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South Korean President Rhee (left), U.S. Commander MacArthur (middle), and U.S. Lieutenant General Hodge (right)
(photo: altervista) |
Counter-arguments to the Criticisms
Remarks by Dean Acheson before the National Press Club
(credit: Harry S. Truman Library & Museum) |
In contrast to Eisenhower’s fierce criticism toward Acheson for creating a “political catastrophe,” there is an argument asserting that the speech to the National Press Club was misinterpreted by the Republicans and critics. (9) Regarding the critics of Acheson’s speech, the government strongly complained that “irresponsible critics [had] repeated the false charge…” that “based on a quotation torn out of context and misinterpreted by those who use the Big Lie tactics.” (10) The State department pinpointed that the critics never quoted Acheson’s mention of resisting an armed attack on a free democratic country as “the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations….” (11) Acheson added in his memoir that “[critics said] things I didn’t say and [omitted] a significant and relevant part of what I did say.” (12) NSC 48/2, a classified document drafted by the State and Defense Secretary and other advisors and reported to President Truman in 1949, about a year before Acheson’s speech, affirmed that it was in America’s interest to support the “development of sufficient military power in selected non-Communist nations of Asia…to prevent further encroachment by Communism.” (13) Understanding the government’s decisive commitment to supporting democratic nations around the world and holding back the Soviet power in Asia, it is almost nonsense to believe that Acheson personally overturned the government-level decision in less than a year and publicly gave a pretext to North Korea for invading South Korea. Following the logic of Senator Kenneth S. Wherry and Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Acheson left out not only Korea but also other Asian continental countries like India and Oceania countries like Australia. However, there was no significant Communist attack on other Asian continental and Oceania countries and even on Formosa. Hence, it is hard to assume that North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950 because Acheson excluded Korea from the defense line as the critics insisted.
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The main issue in the debate:
Did Kim and Stalin know about the exclusion of Korea?
Because the Korean War was followed by the speech six months later, people easily think that Acheson made oversight of giving North Korea a pretext for invasion. On the other hand, considering even Joseph Stalin worried about the American intervention “until the moment the Korean War began,” it is hard to conclude that Acheson’s speech to the National Press Club in 1950 invited the Soviet Union and North Korea to invade South Korea. (14) American historian Bruce Cumings reinforces this idea by saying, “when the North Koreans commented on this speech, they had South Korea included in the defense perimeter.” (15) There had been no official transcript of the speech for weeks, and the North Koreans doubtlessly believed that Secretary Acheson included South Korea in the perimeter. Three days after the speech, The New York Times also included Korea in the perimeter and reported that the defense perimeter ran through “occupied Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and the friendly Philippines.” (16) No one had ever doubted that South Korea was the U.S. responsibility. And, Acheson too was not denying this responsibility in his speech.
Kim Il-Sung delivering a speech in front of a portrait of Joseph Stalin
(photo: Wall Street Journal)
(photo: Wall Street Journal)
Footnotes
(1) “Wherry Says Blood of G.I’s in Korean War is on Acheson,” New York Daily Times, August 17, 1950, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(2) “Eisenhower Scores Acheson ‘Mistake,’ New York Times, Sept. 23, 1952, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(3) George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 649.
(4) “THE NATION: McCarthy accuses,” New York Times, March 12, 1950, E2. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(5) Robert T. Oliver, Why War Came in Korea, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950), 7. [HeinOnline]
(6) Oliver, 8.
(7) “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Z. Williams of the Office of Northwest Asian Affairs,” The Foreign Relations of the United States, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d3. [FRUS]
(8) James Matray, “Dean Acheson’s Press Club Speech Reexamined,” Journal of Conflict Studies, 22 (1), accessed Oct. 28, 2020, https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/366/578.
(9) “Eisenhower Scores Acheson ‘Mistake,’” New York Times, Sept. 23, 1952, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(10) “Remarks by Dean Acheson Before the National Press Club,” Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/remarks-dean-acheson-national-press-club?documentid=NA&pagenumber=1.
(11) “Speech on the Far East,” Central Intelligence Agency Library.
(12) Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969),691.
(13)“A Report to the President by the National Security Council,” Foreign Relations of the United States, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d387.
(14) Matray.
(15) Cumings, 72.
(16) “Growing issue: As China and the Far East emerge as the great issue in world affairs,” New York Times, Jan. 15, 1950, E1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(1) “Wherry Says Blood of G.I’s in Korean War is on Acheson,” New York Daily Times, August 17, 1950, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(2) “Eisenhower Scores Acheson ‘Mistake,’ New York Times, Sept. 23, 1952, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(3) George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 649.
(4) “THE NATION: McCarthy accuses,” New York Times, March 12, 1950, E2. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(5) Robert T. Oliver, Why War Came in Korea, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950), 7. [HeinOnline]
(6) Oliver, 8.
(7) “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Z. Williams of the Office of Northwest Asian Affairs,” The Foreign Relations of the United States, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d3. [FRUS]
(8) James Matray, “Dean Acheson’s Press Club Speech Reexamined,” Journal of Conflict Studies, 22 (1), accessed Oct. 28, 2020, https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/366/578.
(9) “Eisenhower Scores Acheson ‘Mistake,’” New York Times, Sept. 23, 1952, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(10) “Remarks by Dean Acheson Before the National Press Club,” Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/remarks-dean-acheson-national-press-club?documentid=NA&pagenumber=1.
(11) “Speech on the Far East,” Central Intelligence Agency Library.
(12) Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969),691.
(13)“A Report to the President by the National Security Council,” Foreign Relations of the United States, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d387.
(14) Matray.
(15) Cumings, 72.
(16) “Growing issue: As China and the Far East emerge as the great issue in world affairs,” New York Times, Jan. 15, 1950, E1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]