Historical Background behind the Speech
Soviet flag flying in Berlin (photo: Wikipedia)
Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong in 1945 (photo: Wikipedia)
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When WWII ended, only the United States and the Soviet Union grew stronger out of the war than they were before. After the war, the old Euro-centric system that ruled the world for many centuries collapsed, and the bipolar world order between the United States and the Soviet Union came. In East Asia, U.S. troops began to station in Japan to keep it disarmed after the Japanese surrender in 1945. The U.S. army was also deployed to Korea to liberate Koreans and keep order after the Japanese's return to their island. Chinese military leader Chiang Kai-Shek gained control of China in 1928, but corruptions and incapacity in his administration destabilized his rule over China and lost mainland China to Communist leader Mao Zedong in 1949. When Chiang retreated to the island of Formosa after losing the mainland, Dean Acheson and the Truman administration were blamed for having “abandoned” Chinese nationalists and “lost” China to the Communists. (1) Critics argued that the Truman administration's cut off of military and economic aids and indifference toward Chiang's China deserted the regime and led it to collapse in misery. In fact, the administration thought their aids to Chiang was "pouring sand in a rat hole" and questioned whether their military or financial aid could save the already hopeless Chiang. (2) In January 1950, at the National Press Club, Acheson gave a speech in response to the critics who argued that he lost China. Acheson explained his views on Asian affairs and introduced his strategic plans in Asia.
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The National Press Club Speech
Acheson explained his views on Asian affairs and introduced his strategic plan in Asia. In his speech, he explained that Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by the communists not because “American aid was too little” or “[America] did the wrong things at the wrong time,” but because the Chinese people in their “misery” lost faith in the Nationalist government. (2) He put the blame for losing China upon the Chinese Nationalist government that at the time was “weak, divided internally, riddled with corruption, and lacking in popular support.” (3) Criticizing the Soviet Union for expanding its power into the Northern provinces of China, Acheson said, “anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest.” (4) He aroused a sense of binary suggesting the United States as a friend and the Soviet Union as an enemy of the Asian people. In his memoir, Acheson described that the Soviet Union was going against a strong desire of the Asian people for “autonomous development” calling Communism a “powerful instrument of Russian imperialism.” (5)
He went on and explained America’s “inescapable” military commitments in Japan, Ryukoku, and the Philippines. (6) The defense line he claimed left the Korean Peninsula and Formosa island— areas U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan thought not “worth defending”— out of the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. (7) In Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, Acheson explained his point of suggesting the defense perimeter. His point was that if the specifically named areas where the United States had special military commitments were attacked, the United States “would defend [them] alone… just as [it] would defend [its] continental area.” (8) Acheson said in the speech that “no person can guarantee [other] areas against military attack,” but he also stated that such attack on areas on the other side of the defense perimeter would be resisted through the United Nations.
He went on and explained America’s “inescapable” military commitments in Japan, Ryukoku, and the Philippines. (6) The defense line he claimed left the Korean Peninsula and Formosa island— areas U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan thought not “worth defending”— out of the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. (7) In Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, Acheson explained his point of suggesting the defense perimeter. His point was that if the specifically named areas where the United States had special military commitments were attacked, the United States “would defend [them] alone… just as [it] would defend [its] continental area.” (8) Acheson said in the speech that “no person can guarantee [other] areas against military attack,” but he also stated that such attack on areas on the other side of the defense perimeter would be resisted through the United Nations.
U.S. Defense Perimeter in East Asia explained in Acheson's speech (photo: SAGE Knowledge)
Analyses
American historian Bruce Cumings claims that Acheson had another important intention behind the exclusion of South Korea in the defense perimeter. Keeping “ambiguity” in his strategy for defending South Korea, Acheson prevented South Korean president Rhee from becoming “emboldened to start a war” against North Korea to reunify the country, which could lead to another World War. (9) American military historian Bevin Alexander describes that Acheson’s speech reflected “anxiety about the commitment of American troops to a land war in Asia….” (10) The Joint Chiefs already concluded at the time that in terms of containing communism, they “[had] little strategic interest in maintaining its present troops and bases in Korea.” (11) Acheson urged for “a long-term program to create a Korean government economically strong and able to defend itself” and hoped that South Korea would develop as a free democratic country based on U.S. economic supports but hesitated to be militarily committed to it. (12)
American political scientist Victor Cha explains that America had divided attention and commitments after the Second World War. While London and Paris were struggling to recover from the war, the United States had to take up their roles on top of its own increased responsibility as a leading world power. And, Acheson understood that “with greatly reduced forces, [the American military] felt unable to police Germany and Japan, protect America, and also occupy Korea.” (13) Furthermore, South Korea appeared to be a less attractive military partner due to its poor economic status when especially the United States was undergoing an increasing rate of unemployment and declining production rate after WWII.
American political scientist Victor Cha explains that America had divided attention and commitments after the Second World War. While London and Paris were struggling to recover from the war, the United States had to take up their roles on top of its own increased responsibility as a leading world power. And, Acheson understood that “with greatly reduced forces, [the American military] felt unable to police Germany and Japan, protect America, and also occupy Korea.” (13) Furthermore, South Korea appeared to be a less attractive military partner due to its poor economic status when especially the United States was undergoing an increasing rate of unemployment and declining production rate after WWII.
Dean Acheson delivering his speech to the National Press Club
(photo: Teaching American History)
(photo: Teaching American History)
<[Dean Acheson] Hidden Truth behind the Korean War>
Footnotes
(1) “Truman, Acheson Open Eyes of 2 critics of China Policy,” The Washington Post, April 29, 1949, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(2) “Speech on the Far East,” Central Intelligence Agency Library, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1950-01-12.pdf.
(3) George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 575.
(4) “Speech on the Far East”
(5) Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969), 356. [Internet Archive]
(6) Acheson, 356.
(7) Victor D. Cha, “3 Origins of the American Alliance system in Asia.” Powerplay: The Origin of the American Alliance system in Asia, 2016, 44. [JSTOR]
(8) Acheson, 691.
(9) Bruce Cumings, The Korean War, (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 72. [Internet Achieve]
(10) Bevin Alexander, Korea, the first war we lost, (New York: Hippocrene, 1993), 18. [HathiTrust]
(11) “U.S. Reveals Papers on 49’ Korea Pullout,” The New York Times, April 19, 1977, 11 [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(12) “Dean Acheson Makes Answers to His Critics,” Daily Boston Globe, July 30, 1950, C36. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(13) Daily Boston Globe, C36.
(1) “Truman, Acheson Open Eyes of 2 critics of China Policy,” The Washington Post, April 29, 1949, 1. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(2) “Speech on the Far East,” Central Intelligence Agency Library, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1950-01-12.pdf.
(3) George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 575.
(4) “Speech on the Far East”
(5) Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969), 356. [Internet Archive]
(6) Acheson, 356.
(7) Victor D. Cha, “3 Origins of the American Alliance system in Asia.” Powerplay: The Origin of the American Alliance system in Asia, 2016, 44. [JSTOR]
(8) Acheson, 691.
(9) Bruce Cumings, The Korean War, (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 72. [Internet Achieve]
(10) Bevin Alexander, Korea, the first war we lost, (New York: Hippocrene, 1993), 18. [HathiTrust]
(11) “U.S. Reveals Papers on 49’ Korea Pullout,” The New York Times, April 19, 1977, 11 [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(12) “Dean Acheson Makes Answers to His Critics,” Daily Boston Globe, July 30, 1950, C36. [ProQuest Historical Newspapers]
(13) Daily Boston Globe, C36.